Precedent, Super-Precedent --abstract
The idea of super-precedent was first posited by (then) Prof. Posner & Prof. Landis 30 years ago, but as
a throw-away, and was not picked up in the jargon. In 2000 Judge Michael Luttig of the 4th Circuit used
it –as “super stare decisis” –and this time it did gain a following. “Super-precedent” –and even “superduper precedent” --had an airing at both the Alito and Roberts hearings before the Senate Judiciary
Committee and soon generated a couple of academic articles. No doubt there will be more. This is my
contribution to the debate.
How, if at all, are we to make sense of the notion of super-precedent? Is it useful? I examine the
concept as it might fit into the theories of stare decisis that have been in vogue at various times, in the
process elaborating on the doctrine and the theories accounting for it. I also look at its use in the Senate
hearings of Supreme Court nominees Roberts and Alito for indicia of the neologism’s popular usage and
possible future.
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ToDos: ***
Precedent, Super-Precedent.

“Stare decisis is at least the everyday working rule of our law.”1
“[R]emember that a rule of precedent, or stare decisis, is a means and not an end.”2

“Super-precedent” (or, equivalently, ‘super stare decisis’3) has crept into our usage lately, primarily
through its use –along with “super-duper precedent” –in the interrogations of Chief Justice Roberts and
Justice Alito before the senate Judiciary Committee.4 Of course the cases that focused this attention
were Roe v. Wade5 and its principal successor, Planned Parenthood v. Casey,6 the point being to solicit
acceptance from the nominees. But the nominees did not concede, and with justification; on any theory
of precedent these cases’ stature as super-precedent is questionable.7 Although it has taken some hits of
late,8 we might use Marbury v. Madison9 as a safe exemplar,10 or Erie Railroad v. Tompkins.11
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Benjamin N. Cardozo, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS, 20 (1921).
Max Radin, The Trail of the Calf, 32 CORNELL L.QUARTERLY 137, 159 (1946).
3
Some draw a distinction between the ‘precedent’ and ‘stare decisis’: See, e.g., Frederick G. Kempin, Jr., Precedent and
Stare Decisis: The Critical Years, 1800 to 1850, 3 AM.J.LEGAL HISTORY 28, 30 (1959)(Precedent needs a doctrine
developed through a line of cases; stare decisis can use one case alone as authority); K.K.DuVivier, Are Some Words Better
Left Unpublished?: Precedent and the Role of Unpublished Decisions, 3 J.APP.PRAC. & PROC. 397 (2001)(stare decisis
means only “stand by things decided”; precedent is about bases for decision, and is an “evolving doctrine.”); Polly J. Price,
Precedent and Judicial Power After the Founding, 42 B.C.L.REV. 81, 105 (2000)(stare decisis is strict, formalistic;
precedent is less so.) I shall treat them as synonyms, unless noted. They are of the same ilk. Put ‘doctrine of’ in front of
them and they are indistinguishable in ordinary legal usage; but though you can have ‘a precedent’ you cannot have ‘a stare
decisis;’ stare decisis is used only for the doctrine.
4
See text infra at notes __-__. Professor Farber uses the term ‘bedrock precedent’ to much the same effect; see Daniel A.
Farber, The Rule of Law and the Law of Precedents, 90 Minn. L. Rev. 1173, 1175, 1176-80 (2006)
5
410 U.S. 113 (1973)
6
505 U.S. 833 (1992)
7
Michael J. Gerhardt, Super Precedent, 90 Minn. L. Rev. 1204, 1219-20 (2006)
8
From Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837 (1984) through United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218 (2000) to
Federal Communications Commission v. Brand X Internet Services __U.S.__, 125 S.Ct. 2688 (2005) there has been a steady
erosion of the power of the courts to interpret legislation in favor administrative agencies. See Kathryn A. Watts, Adapting to
Administrative Law’s Erie Doctrine, 101 NORTHWESTERN U.L.REV. __ (2007), available at SSRN:
http://ssrn.com/abstract=900582 at p.3.
9
5 U.S. 137 (1803); see Gerhardt, supra note __[7] at 1206.
10
The authority of judicial review has become a target of academic scrutiny over the last ten years or so. See Lawrence
Alexander, What is the Problem or Judicial Review? Soc.Sci.Network Electronic Paper Collection,
http://ssrn.com/abstratID=802807 (Examining arguments by Jeremy Waldron and others; “Jeremy Waldron has been on the
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‘Super-precedent’ seems to have been coined in 1976 by Judge (then professor) Posner and
Professor Landes in an article about testing theories of precedent by counting citations; a superprecedent would be
so effective in defining the requirements of the law that it prevents legal disputes from arising in
the first place, or, if they do arise, induces them to be settled without litigation. In the limit, such
a “superprecedent” might never be cited in an appellate opinion and yet have greater precedential
significance than most frequently cited cases.12
The problem was not enough to bother their project as “such cases are probably rare,”13 being either too
narrow or too broad to have significant progeny.14 From this beginning, however, their neologism
seems not to have gained any popular currency.
It was re-introduced in 2000 by Judge Michael Luttig of the 4th Circuit Court of Appeals,
apparently completely afresh, and this time it did catch some attention:
I understand the Supreme Court to have intended its decision in Planned Parenthood v. Casey,
505 U.S. 833, 120 L. Ed. 2d 674, 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992), to be a decision of super-stare decisis
with respect to a woman's fundamental right to choose whether or not to proceed with a
pregnancy. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 844-46 ("Liberty finds no refuge in a jurisprudence of doubt.
Yet 19 years after our holding that the Constitution protects a woman's right to terminate her
pregnancy in its early stages, Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 93 S. Ct. 705, 35 L. Ed. 2d 147 (1973),
that definition of liberty is still questioned. . . . After considering the fundamental constitutional
questions resolved by Roe, principles of institutional integrity, and the rule of stare decisis, we
are led to conclude this: the essential holding of Roe v. Wade should be retained and once again
reaffirmed."). And I believe this understanding to have been not merely confirmed, but
reinforced, by the Court's recent decision in Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 2000 U.S. LEXIS
4484, 120 S. Ct. 2597, 147 L. Ed. 2d 743, 2000 WL 825889, at *4 (2000) ("This Court, in the
course of a generation, has determined and then redetermined that the Constitution offers basic
protection to the woman's right to choose. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 93 S. Ct. 705, 35 L. Ed.
warpath against judicial review.” Id at 1 citing, inter alia, Jeremy Waldron, LAW AND DISAGREEMENT (1999), The Core
of the Case Against Judicial Review (2005))
11
304 U.S. 64 (1938)
12
William M. Landes and Richard A. Posner, Legal Precedent: A Theoretical and empirical Analysis, 19 J. of LAW &
ECONOMICS 249, 251 (1976).
13
Id
14
Id. Perhaps this rationale has to be read to be believed:
If a case is highly specific, it will hardly qualify as “superprecedent”; by definition it will control only those
infrequent cases that present virtually identical facts to those of the case in which it was originally announced. If it
is highly general, and therefore more likely to be an important precedent, it is unlikely to decide –so clearly as to
prevent diputes or litigation from arising –the specific form of the question presented in subsequent cases.
Id.
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2d 147 (1973); Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 112 S. Ct. 2791,
120 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1992). We shall not revisit those legal principles.").15
Although Judge Luttig does not attempt to define it –there are three criteria, or principles in the
quoted passage, viz, consistency of decisions over 19 years, institutional integrity, and the Court’s
resolve “not revisit those legal principles” --there is a rough, intuitive content in the word ‘superprecedent’ (or, synonymously, ‘super-stare decisis’), probably sufficient for popular use.16 To say a case
is a super-precedent means it is judicially unshakeable, a precedential monument which may not be
gainsaid, akin to having the statute-like force of vertical stare decisis horizontally. But what might it
mean if put into legal use? Standing alone, as if self-justifying, in a brief it would not make an
argument, not even of rhetorical moment. So the word needs explication. That is the aim of this paper:
to explain how the concept of ‘super-precedent’ might fit in our understanding of stare decisis.
Section 1 is about stare decisis, the doctrine of precedent: how do we think of it, how do we use
it, and what are the virtues and vices that have balanced so heavily in its favor. The section thus
enumerates the criteria, both empirical and normative, by which we evaluate theories purporting to
explain the doctrine. Sections 2 through 5 describe theories of stare decisis and how they might account
for the concept of super-precedent. Section 2 is about the progenitor, the “declaratory theory” of the
“brooding omnipresence in the sky.” Section 3 is about Christopher Columbus Langdell’s quasiempiricism; it may be inadequate as explanation, but it is still a good description of what we do. Section
4 is about the utterly inadequate “enactment theory” (that cases make rules), the anti-theory of legal
realism, and the legal process theory. Section 5 lays out a rather more detailed theory, the “standard
15

Richmond Medical Center v. Gilmore, 219 F.3d 376-77 (4th Cir., 2000)
Professor Gerhardt gives many definitions, overlapping, interchangeable, functional, and on the whole consistently
serviceable. See Gerhardt, supra note [7] at1205-06, 1207, 1213, 1221, 1222, 1223; most usefully “Super precedents are the
doctrinal, or decisional, foundations for subsequent lines of judicial decisions (often but not always in more than one area of
constitutional law). … Thus, super precedents take on a special status in constitutional law as landmark opinions, so
encrusted and deeply embedded in constitutional law that they have become practically immune to reconsideration and
reversal.” Id at 1205-06. Professor Farber defines ‘bedrock precedent’ as ”: “rulings [which] are not overturned except …
only for compelling reasons.”, Farber, supra note __[3] at 1176, and as “precedents that have become the foundation for large
areas of important doctrine.” Id at 1180.
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theory” that is pretty much accepted today. It provides a natural and consistent account of a spectrum of
precedential force, with super-precedent at the most powerful extreme.
But one may argue about theory and practice, consistency and incoherence ’til the cows come
home without making one whit of difference to popular usage. Section 6 takes up that problem: what
sense can be made of the use of “super-precedent” in the Senate Committee hearings for Chief Justice
Roberts and Justice Alito?

Section 1: What is stare decisis? 17
In law as in so many aspects of life there is often a tension between the wisdom of the past and the
rationality of the present. We see it quite dramatically when ancient religious texts and current
empirical science disagree. In law, received wisdom comes to us not only in the authoritative writings
of the founding fathers (constitutions) and legislatures (statutes) but also in past judicial decisions;
rationality lies in attending to “[t]he felt necessities of the time,”18 that is, in the adaptivity of governing
law to present societal needs.
The Constitution is authoritative, constitutive wisdom from the past; so too are statutes properly
made pursuant to it. 19 These are the texts provided by the ancients, but they do not come with readymade interpretations. Nor do they cover all domains of human behavior, or all sources of conflict.
Judicial decisions full the gap; they have to, as conflicts cannot be left unresolved if society is to survive
as such. It follows that judicial decisions should be normatively adaptive to “[t]he felt necessities of the
time, the prevalent moral and political theories, intuitions of public policy, avowed or unconscious, even
17

Only a few years ago people were talking of the demise of stare decisis, that we no longer had such a doctrine in
operation. In 1999 Professor Lee was able to begin an article with two pages of sources to that effect. Thomas R. Lee, Stare
Decisis in Historical Perspective…, 52 VANDERBILT L.REV. 647, 648-49 (1999)(Many sources and quotes about the
decline or irrelevance of stare decisis to present courts.)
18
Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., THE COMMON LAW, 1 (1881) (beginning perhaps the most famous and most quoted
sentence of all secondary legal literature.)
19
It says so: see U.S.CONST. Art. VI.
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the prejudices which judges share with their fellow-men” as Holmes famously put it.20 But times
change, and those decisions join the authority of the past, texts in tension with new, adaptive rationality.
Stare decisis, the doctrine of precedent, mediates that tension, giving the edge to prior decisions, be they
purely common law, or interpretations of statutes or constitutions.
How does the doctrine of precedent do this? This is a surprisingly difficult question to answer,21
but one the answers to which determine this inquiry into the nature and usefulness of the concept of
super-precedent. For these purposes I shall confine discussion to horizontal stare decisis only, not
vertical; super-precedent, if explicable at all, is so in terms of horizontal, not vertical stare decisis. We
may all have a pretty good grasp of the doctrine, and use it in analysis and argument, yet even at the
descriptive level, theories can be surprisingly variable. For example, although “…the method of
precedents, … is the characteristic and all-pervading method of the common law, for better or
worse,”22 one is surprised to find in a widely used introductory textbook that “appellate courts, or socalled ‘higher’ courts, are not legally bound to adhere to the principle of stare decisis.”23 That is not a
view shared by many, and certainly not by the justices of our Supreme Court.24
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Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., THE COMMON LAW, 1 (1881).
Professor Farber: ““It is one thing to say that a precedent should be followed. It is another to say precisely what it means
to follow precedent. This is not an easy question to answer. As a writer of an earlier generation remarked, "Yet when one
asks, how does one determine the legal significance of judicial precedents? - one finds only fragmentary answers in
authoritative materials and no entirely satisfactory theory offered by the writers who have dealt with the subject." That seems
to remain true today.” Farber, supra note __[3] at 1199, citing Earl Maltz, The Nature of Precedent, 66 N.C. L. Rev. 367 , ,
376-83 (1988) and Neil MacCormick, The Significance of Precedent, 1988 Acta Juridica 174, 178-87, and quoting Edwin W.
Patterson, Jurisprudence: Men and Ideas of the Law 300 (1953).
22
Wright, The Right Hon. Lord, Precedents, 8 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 118,118(1943), reprinted from 4 U.TORONTO
L.J.247(1942).; see also Levi, Edward H.,AN INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL REASONING, 2(1949)' Williams(ed.),SALMOND
ON JURISPRUDENCE, 162 et seq.(11th ed.,1957). But not everyone agrees: compare Grant Gilmore, Formalism and the Law
of Negotiable Instruments, 13 CREIGHTON L.REV.441,443(1979)("Before the Civil War American judges, enthusiastically
taking up the legacy of Lord Mansfield, had approached the process of adjudication with a light-hearted disregard for precedent.")
with Julius Stone, 1966 And All That! Loosing the Chains of Precedent, 69 COLUM.L.REV.1162, 1164(1969)( "...the rules of
precedent have for centuries been thought of as law ... .")
21
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Glaser, Lieberman, Ruescher, Su, & Mills, THE LAWYER’S CRAFT, 23 (2002). See also, Manchester, Salter, and
Moodie, EXPLORING THE LAW: THE DYNAMICS OF PRECEDENT AND STATUTORY INTERPRETATION, 3, 4
(2nd ed., 2000).
24
See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 844 (1992).
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In the United States, especially in commentary on Constitutional interpretation, there is a tension
between precedent and the perceived mandates of the supreme law of the land.25 The tension is especially
poignant for those who purport to find authority only in the Constitution’s original meaning,26 but it is not
exclusive to them.27 What is a judge to do when prior judicial interpretation does not agree with her
understanding of the Constitution’s requirements? Professor Barnett, an uncompromising subscriber to the
original meaning of the Constitution as supreme,28 mockingly posits “the existence of a rule of law that
precedes any of the super precedents they cite - a rule of law that might be called "super-duper
precedent": the text of the Constitution itself.”29
Judicial decisions have different precedential power according as they are interpretations of the
Constitution, statutes, or purely common law. This variation is determined by damage control:30 as a
constitutional decision can only be changed only by amendment, a process so difficult as to be
practically ineffective, stare decisis should be weaker, the Court ready to correct an interpretation that
has proven maladaptive.31 Decisions under statutes may be treated to a stricter doctrine of precedent
because legislative correction is simple and readily available: If the legislature does not like a judicial
interpretation, it can revise the statute.32 No sweeping statement can be made about the power of
25

Daniel A. Farber and Suzanna Sherry, DESPERATELY SEEKING CERTAINTY: THE MISGUIDED QUEST FOR
CONSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATIONS, 25 (2002), Farber, supra note __[3] at 1173; Barnett, supra, note _[20?] at 1233.
26
For example, Barnett, supra note __[2o] at 1233-34
27
Farber, supra note __[3] at 1173-74.
28
Barnett, supra note __[2o] at 1233 (characterizing himself as a “fearless originalist”.)
29
Id at 1248.
30
Any system, to survive, must be able to control the harmful effects of inevitable maladaptive, unjust, & unworkable
decisions. Justice Brandeis may have been the first to articulate the differential effect of different types of decision: “[I]n
cases involving the Federal Constitution, where correction through legislative action is practically impossible, th[e] court has
often overruled its earlier decisions. The court bows to the lessons of experience and the force of better reasoning,
recognizing that the process of trial and error, so fruitful in the physical sciences, is appropriate also in the judicial function.”
Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 406-08 (1932)(Brandeis, J., dissenting)(footnotes omitted).
31
See e.g., Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649, 665 (1944)(per Reed, A.J. “In constitutional questions, where correction
depends upon amendment and not upon legislative action this Court throughout its history has freely exercised its power to
reexamine the basis of its constitutional decisions.”)
32
Justice Kennedy: "One reason that we give great weight to stare decisis in the area of statutory construction is that
Congress is free to change this Court's interpretation of its legislation." Neal v. United States, 516 U.S.284, 295 (1996)
quoting Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 736 (1977). See also Lawrence C. Marshall, 'Let Congress Do It': The
Case For an Absolute Rule of Stare Decisis, 88 MICH. L. REV. 177 (1989); William N. Eskridge, Jr., The Case of the
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precedent in common law decision making. Legislative revision is available, thus it is more like stare
decisis in statutory decisions than constitutional interpretation,33 but in some circumstances that is
inappropriate. In purely common law domains strictness of adherence to precedents should be
determined by the nature of the behavioral domain governed. Where denizens look to decisions for
guidance, those decisions should have very powerful precedential authority; on the other hand, where
virtually nobody knows or seeks out judicial authority before acting (think of negligent infliction of
emotional distress), stare decisis should be commensurately weak and rational adaptivity to current
cultural standards more compelling.34
By far the most popular virtue of stare decisis, and surely its most significant, is the stability,
continuity and predictability it lends to the law.35 The great virtue of stability and predictability in the
law is that the denizens governed by it can plan their actions in reliance on it.36 Justice Brandeis: “Stare

Amorous Defendant: Criticizing Absolute Stare Decisis for Statutory Cases, 88 MICH. L. REV. 2450 (1990); Lawrence C.
Marshall, Contempt of Congress: A Reply to the Critics of an Absolute Rule of Stare Decisis, 88 MICH. L. REV. 2467
(1990).
33
Farber, supra no__[3?] at 1184: (“We should resist, however, a simple equation between the common law and
constitutional law. Constitutional law does not rely purely on judicial precedents in the same way as the common law.” The
three precedential articles on super-precedent, Farber, supra n_[3], Gerhardt, supra n__[10?] and Barnett, supra n_[20?] are
about constitutional interpretation.
34
See Sinclair, GUIDE TO STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 40 (2000)
35
For example: Blackstone, supra note __ at *69 (“For it is an established rule to abide by former precedents, where the
same points come again in litigation: … as also because the law in that case being solemnly declared and determined, what
before was uncertain, and perhaps indifferent, is now become a permanent rule which it is not in the breast of any subsequent
judge to alter or vary from according to his own private sentiments: he being sworn to determine, not according to his own
private judgments, but according to the known laws and customs of the land; not delegated to pronounce a new law, but to
maintain and expound an old one.”); Benjamin N. Cardozo, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS, 150
(1921)(With the varying composition of the court varying, “The situation would … be intolerable if the weekly changes in
the composition of the court were accompanied by changes in its rulings. …”); Robert von Moschzisker, Stare Decisis in
Courts of Last Resort, 37 HARV.L.REV. 409, 409 (1924)( “A natural desire for stability in the law gave rise to reliance on
decided cases as far back as Bracton and the early Year Books of the fourteenth century.”);Max Radin, The Trail of the Calf,
32 CORNELL L.QUARTERLY 137, 147 (1946); Frederick Schauer, Precedent, 39 STAN.L.REV. 571, 601-02
(1987)(“Here precedent has its greatest role to play, generating a format for decisionmaking that channels decisions toward
consideration of a comparatively limited number of factors likely to be repeated over time.”); Thomas R. Lee, Stare Decisis
in Historical Perspective…, 52 VANDERBILT L.REV. 647, 652-53 (1999); Farber, supra n__[3] at 1196 quoting . Henry
Paul Monaghan, Stare Decisis and Constitutional Adjudication, 88 Colum. L. Rev. 723, 751 (1988)( "departure from
precedent may sometimes threaten the stability and continuity of the political order and should therefore be avoided.")
36
James Kent, 1 COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW, *476 /528 (1ST ed. 1826 [*], this from the 7th ed., 1851)(stare
decisis fosters reliance of “professional men” … “the community have a right” to rely on a decision “to regulate their actions
and contracts by it.”); Frederick Schauer, Precedent, 39 STAN.L.REV. 571, 597-98 (1987)(“The Argument from
Predictability”: predictability helps us plan our lives.)
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decisis is usually the wise policy, because in most matters it is more important that the applicable rule of
law be settled than it be settled right.”37
Along with stability and certainty goes minimizing judicial discretion.38 F.F. Alexander
Hamilton saw this as central: “To avoid an arbitrary discretion in the courts, it is indispensable that they
should be bound by strict rules and precedents, which serve to define and point out their duty in every
particular case that comes before them … .”39 Stare decisis is not merely about garnering support from a
prior case with which one agrees; if it is to be meaningful, to provide stability and certainty, a judge’s
choices must be constrained by prior cases.
A corollary virtue of following stare decisis is that it “contributes to the actual and perceived
integrity of the judicial process.”40 Following precedent tends to show that the court is not following the
whims of political winds or the judges’ own predilections, not, in the fashionable phrase, legislating
from the bench.41 The argument is easily carried too far: “[S]tandardizing decisions within a
decisionmaking environment may generally strengthen that decisionmaking environment as an

37

Burnett v. Coronado Oil and Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 406-407(1932), Justice Louis Brandeis, dissenting. Justice Rehnquist:
“Stare decisis is the preferred course because it promotes the evenhanded, predictable, and consistent development of legal
principles, [and] fosters reliance on judicial decisions … .” Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 827 (1991) per Rehnquist,
C.J., citing Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254, 265-266 (1986).
38
Blackstone, supra note __ at *69 (“For it is an established rule to abide by former precedents, where the same points come
again in litigation: as well as to keep the scale of justice even and steady, and not liable to waver with every new judge’s
opinion… .”); Frank H. Easterbrook, Stability and Reliability in Judicial Decisions, 73 CORNELL L.REV. 422, 423
(1988)(“Precedent decentralizes decisionmaking and allows each judge to build on the wisdom of others”, “economizes on
information,” limits judicial idiosyncracy, & increases the chances of correctness.); Farber, supra n__[3] at 1196, quoting
Monaghan, supra n__[46?] at 752 ("Adherence to precedent can contribute to the important notion that the law is impersonal
in character, that the Court believes itself to be following a "law which binds [it] as well as the litigants.'" quoting Archibald
Cox, The role of the supreme Court in American Government 50 (1976)).
39
The Federalist, No.78, 507at 510
40
Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 827 (1991) per Rehnquist, C.J.( “Stare decisis is the preferred course because it …
contributes to the actual and perceived integrity of the judicial process. See Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254, 265-266
(1986).”)
41
Thomas R. Lee, Stare Decisis in Historical Perspective…, 52 VANDERBILT L.REV. 647, 653 (1999).
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institution”,42 but standardized decisions we get from legislation, and at the cost of justice in particular
cases.43
However, to mean anything, stare decisis must, at least on occasion, work against justice: as Lee
puts it, stare decisis means a court “must [follow a prior case] when it perceives an error in the ways of
the past.”44 Justice and fairness are sometimes trotted out as values enhanced by the doctrine, 45 the idea
being that it requires treating right cases alike.46 But that is only a virtue where the prior case was
decided justly; otherwise it means “an imprisonment of reason”47 and the perpetuation of error, of
injustice.
Common law and its principle of stare decisis could not have survived over more than five
centuries in England and two in the United States, through so many social upheavals and radical
technological and economic changes without being flexible and adaptive. Lord Mansfield saw the
common law's adaptability to change in the requirements of justice as its principal advantage over
statutes:
[A] statute very seldom can take in all cases, therefore the common law, that works itself
pure by rules drawn from the fountain of justice, is for this reason superior to an act of
parliament.48

42

Frederick Schauer, Precedent, 39 STAN.L.REV. 571, 602 (1987)(599 “The Argument from Strengthened
Decisionmaking” …600 “2. strengthening the instituition”)
43
Justice Scalia: “But the whole point of rulemaking (or of statutory law as opposed to case-by-case common law
development) is to incur a small possibility of inaccuracy in exchange for a large increase in efficiency and predictability.”
Association of Data Processing Service Organizations, Inc. v. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 745 F.2d
677, 689 (D.C.Cir. 1984), (Scalia, C.J.).
44
Thomas R. Lee, Stare Decisis in Historical Perspective…, 52 VANDERBILT L.REV. 647, 654 (1999)
45
Frederick Schauer, Precedent, 39 STAN.L.REV. 571, 595-96 (1987)(“The Argument from Fairness” arguing that this
“relatively large categories of likeness”, but missing the point that exactly that undermines stability and certainty and
constraint on judicial decisions.)
46
‘[J]ustice demands, wherever that concept is found, that like men be treated alike in like conditions. Why, I do not know;
the fact is given.” Karl N. Llewellyn, THE BRAMBLE BUSH, 42 (1930).
47
Guardians Assn. v. Civil Service Comm'n of New York City, 463 U.S. 582, 618 (1983) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (quoting
United States v. International Boxing Club of N. Y., Inc., 348 U.S. 236, 249, 99 L. Ed. 290, 75 S. Ct. 259 (1955) (Frankfurter,
J., dissenting)).[needs checking.]
48
Omychund v. Barker, 1 Atk. 21, 33, 26 Eng.Rep. 15, 22-23 (Ch. 1744) (argument of Mr.Murray, then Solicitor-General of
England, later Lord Mansfield).
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Stare decisis works to the contrary.
Perpetuation of error is the principle charge against the strictures of stare decisis.49 Compared
with following precedent, the willingness of courts to drink from the "fountain of justice" is not so
evident. A great judge like Cardozo may have sought a relaxed, adaptive stare decisis,50 but few have
had his insight, confidence, and powers of persuasion. Critics have long bemoaned the reluctance of
courts to react to societal change. Arch-positivist John Austin wrote:
But it is much to be regretted that Judges of capacity, experience and weight, have not
seized every opportunity of introducing a new rule (a rule beneficial for the future). ...
[T]he Judges of the Common Law Courts would not do what they ought to have done,
namely to model their rules of law and of procedure to the growing exigencies of society,
instead of stupidly and sulkily adhering to the old and barbarous usages.51
Striking the right balance between stability and adaptivity, that is, explaining the natural or rational
limits of the doctrine’s compulsive power, is one of the principle burdens of a theory of precedent.
Finally, stare decisis enhances the pragmatic virtue of efficiency; without it, every decision
would be a new one, to be argued on a clean slate. “The obligation to follow precedent begins with
necessity, … With Cardozo, we recognize that no judicial system could do society’s work if it eyed each

49

Max Radin, The Trail of the Calf, 32 CORNELL L.QUARTERLY 137 (1946)(Begins with a poem describing a calf
wandering through scrub, creating a germ of a path, which ends up being the main thoroughfare of a great metropolis, rather
like Bleeker Street; it is not, he says, how we should think of stare decisis; but why not?) Nor does it help to say, as
Chancellor Kent was fond of repeating, that stare decisis does not apply if “it can be shown that the law was misunderstood
or misapplied in that particular case”; James Kent, 1 COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW, 528[*475] (1ST ed. 1826
[*], this from the 7th ed., 1851)(similarly a precedent “ought not to be disturbed, unless by a court of appeal or review, and
never by the same court, except for very cogent reasons, and upon a clear manifestation of error.” Id at *476 /528) as that
simply begs the question of criteria of “misunderstanding” or “misapplication:”
50
Benjamin N. Cardozo, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS, 150 (1921)(He used as an example Klein v.
Maravelas, 219 N.Y. 383, 114 N.E. 809 (1916) in which the great Judge Benjamin N. Cardozo frankly acknowledged error in
the prior decision on point: “We think it is our duty to hold that the decision in Wright v. Hart is wrong. The unanimous or
all but unanimous voice of the judges of the land, in federal and state courts alike, has upheld the constitutionality of these
laws. At the time of our decision in Wright v. Hart, such laws were new and strange. They were thought in the prevailing
opinion to represent the fitful prejudices of the hour (Wright v. Hart, supra, at p. 342). The fact is that they have come to stay,
and like laws may be found on the statute books of every state. … The needs of successive generations may make restrictions
imperative to-day which were vain and capricious to the vision of times past… .” Id, 219 N.Y. at 385-86, 114 N.E. 810-11, a
large string of cites omitted.); similarly from a rather less exulted source, Leavitt and Lee v. Morrow, 6 Ohio St. 71,
81(1856): “It would seem, therefore, that a rule which, in its tendency, is calculated to foster bad faith and defeat the
purposes of justice, ought not to be adhered to, simply on account of its antiquity.”
51

2 AUSTIN, LECTURES ON JURISPRUDENCE, 647 (5th ed. 1885).
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issue afresh in every case that raised it.”52 The reference is to Judge Cardozo’s 1920 Storrs Lectures,
“Judicial Process,” which gave us the benchmark quotable: “[T]he labor of judges would be increased
almost to the breaking point if every past decision could be reopened in every case, and one could not
lay one’s own course of bricks on the secure foundations laid by others who had gone before him.”53
There are two reasons here: the burden of numerosity were all cases to be decided afresh at all levels
constrained only by the litigants’ willingness and budget; and the insecure base of decisions to be made.
From a societal point of view stare decisis can be seen as promoting efficiency in dispute resolution
resource allocation.54
And there are those who are implacably hostile to stare decisis, most famously Jeremy Bentham.
Do you know how they make [common law]? Just as a man makes laws for his dog.
When your dog anything you want to break him of, you wait till he does it, and then beat
him for it. This is the way you make laws for your dog: and this is the way the judges
make law for you and me.55
He has a point. It is stock jurisprudential wisdom that one cannot be bound by a law of which he or she
has no notice.56 Bentham himself said it: “That a law may be obeyed, it is necessary that it should be
known.”57 But how can the ordinary denizen know of prior judicial decisions? Still fewer than half a
percent of the United States populace have the legal training necessary to find a case, and for almost all

52

Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 844 (1992) per Souter, J.(in the ellipsis: “and
a contrary necessity marks its outer limit”, of which more later.)
53
Benjamin N. Cardozo, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS, 149 (1921); cited or quoted by all commentators
I’ve seen, e.g., Frederick Schauer, Precedent, 39 STAN.L.REV. 571, 599 (1987)(“The Argument from Strengthened
Decisionmaking… 1. Decisionmaking Efficiency” –quoting Cardozo); Thomas R. Lee, Stare Decisis in Historical
Perspective…, 52 VANDERBILT L.REV. 647, 652 (1999)(quoting Cardozo.)
54
Frank H. Easterbrook, Stability and Reliability in Judicial Decisions, 73 CORNELL L.REV. 422, 423 (1988)(It
“economizes on information”); Thomas R. Lee, Stare Decisis in Historical Perspective…, 52 VANDERBILT L.REV. 647
(1999)(it promotes economy in dispute resolution resource allocation.)
55
Bentham, 5 WORKS, supra at 235.
56
Aquinas, St. Thomas, SUMMA THEOLOGICA, Question 90, Articles 1 and 3 (1273); John Locke, SECOND TREATISE
ON GOVERNMENT, §§ 57, 136 (1690); William Blackstone, 1 COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND, 4546 (4th American edition, George Chase, ed., 1938); Jeremy Bentham, “Of Promulgation of the Laws," 1 WORKS 155
(Bowring, ed. 1859); Lon L. Fuller, THE MORALITY OF LAW, 34-35,39(1964); Lambert v. California, 355 U.S. 225
(1957); Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108 (1972).
57
Bentham, 1 WORKS, supra, at 157. Similarly, see Aquinas, SUMMA THEOLOGICA, supra, at Question 90, Art. 4; John
Locke, SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT, §136 (1690).
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the activities of life that have potential legal ramifications neither they nor anyone else has the time to
look. And what of the landmark case --the one that sets a new standard? The most assiduous legal
research would not find it, because it was somewhere in the future.58 This leads to the criticism that
common law decisionmaking is intrinsically retroactive;59 but retroactive law has long been frowned
on,60 and the Constitution prohibits retroactivity at both the federal and state level.61 It’s a conundrum
with which every theory of stare decisis should come to grips.
Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals Judge Frank Easterbrook says that although we need a theory
to explain, justify and constrain our reliance on precedent, “we do not have such a theory. … no one has
a principled theory to offer.”62 Were he correct, it should indeed “frighten us.”63 Common law with its
characteristic stare decisis has been serving our legal decisional needs for more than two centuries and
those of England for nearly five centuries, through a great variety of circumstances: how could it be
inexplicable? To the contrary: There have always been theories, or at least as long as there have been
theorists.
We evaluate a theory of stare decisis according to how well it fits actual practice -- what judges
and lawyers do in arguing from and about precedent ---and how it explains the qualities --be they
58

Max Radin, The Trail of the Calf, 32 CORNELL L.QUARTERLY 137, 148 (1946)( “Indeed, the fact that a case is in the
reports is in itself evidence that when the situation arose, the law was uncertain, in spite of generations during which stare
decisis has been dominant.”)
59
See, e.g., Kenneth Kress, Legal Reasoning and Coherence Theories: Dworkin's rights thesis, Retroactivity, and the Linear
Order of Deicisions, 72 CALIF. L. REV. 369 (1984).
60
Demosthenes called a retroactive statute "the most disgraceful and scandalous ever enacted in your assembly."
Demosthenes' "Speech against Timokrates," XXIV DEMOSTHENES, 371, 388 (353 B.C.E.)(J.H.Vince, trans., Loeb
Classical Library, 1935).
61
United States Const., Art.1, §§ 9 and 10. However this was interpretively restricted to criminal statutes only in 1798;
Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386 (1798). See Laura Ricciardi & Michael Sinclair, Retroactive Civil Legislation, 27
U.TOL.L.REV. 301, 302-328 (1996); Daniel E. Troy, RETROACTIVE LEGISLATION (1998).
62
Frank H. Easterbrook, Stability and Reliability in Judicial Decisions, 73 CORNELL L.REV. 422 , 422 (1988). For
examples to the contrary see e.g., Eisenhower, James J., III, Four Theories of Precedent and its Role in Judicial Decisions,
61 TEMPLE L. REV. 871 (1988)(finding theories of stare decisis in the works of four great jurisprudes, Hans Kelsen,
GENERAL THEORY OF LAW AND STATE 124-50 (1945), H.L.A.Hart, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 124-132 (1961),
Ronald Dworkin, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 81-90 (1977), and Joseph Raz, THE AUTHORITY OF LAW 180-95
(1979).)
63
Frank H. Easterbrook, Stability and Reliability in Judicial Decisions, 73 CORNELL L.REV. 422 , 422 (1988). The
“frighten us” bit comes in a slightly different context, viz, “Text and precedent are an old pair. So old it should frighten us
that we do not have a theory of their interaction.” Id.
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virtues, vices, or conundrums --of this doctrine that we hold so jurisprudentially dear. A theory should
also explain how, as a matter of history, a workable balance of virtues and vices is so commonly –
although not always –achieved. Most importantly, it should provide guidance in answering “The sixtyfour thousand dollar question … when to adhere and when to reverse.”64
One’s theory of stare decisis sets the context in which to evaluate an explanation of superprecedent.

Section 2. The Declaratory Theory
Judges of the new United States had no doubt about the obligation to precedent: to them, as to the
framers of the Constitution, precedent was intrinsic to the role of judging.65 They understood deciding
cases to require finding and applying law, not making it; the latter power was expressly allocated to the
legislature.66 Following precedent, the application of law previously found, was part and parcel of
judging. In this respect these early judges were simply following in the English common law tradition, a
tradition they learned more through the works of Blackstone67 and Hale68 than old English cases.69
Why should a judge follow a prior judge’s discovered law? In those days the answer lay in the
“declaratory theory” of stare decisis.

64

Randy E. Barnett, It's a Bird, It's a Plane, No, It's Super Precedent: A Response to Farber and Gerhardt, 90 Minn. L. Rev.
1232, 1236 (2006).
65
The late Eighth Circuit judge and legal historian, Judge Richard S. Arnold, explained this in Anastasoff v. United States,
223 F.3d 898, vacated as moot on reh’g en banc, 235 F.3d 1054 (8th Cir. 2000) at 900; see Michael B.W.Sinclair, Anastasoff
versus Hart: The Constitutionality and Wisdom of Denying Precedential Authority to Circuit Court Decisions, 64
U.PITT.L.REV. 695, 706 (2003).
66

Id., U.S.CONST. art. III, §1.
William Blackstone, 1 COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND *69 (1765).
68
Sir Matthew Hale, THE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW OF ENGLAND 44 et seq. (1713)(Charles M. Gray, ed.,
U. Chicago Press, 1971).
69
Chancellor Kent, a near contemporary of the Framers, wrote of Blackstone that he “is justly placed at the head of all the
modern writers who treat of the general elementary principles of law.” James Kent, 1 COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN
LAW 512 (1826).
67
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Remember Holmes’ derogatory reference to the “brooding omnipresence in the sky”?70 The
brooding omnipresence was a morality, universally applicable, a blueprint for propriety in all behavior.
For many of the founding fathers, at least in their public moments, the world had been created by God
according to a plan, and that plan reached not just the physical aspects but also the moral. “This law of
nature, being coeval with mankind, and dictated by God himself, is of course superior in obligation to
any other. It is binding over all the globe, in all countries, and at all times; no human laws are of any
validity, if contrary to this…”71 This is not to require some established religion to justify stare decisis;
it is simply a recognition of one prevailing and superior morality.72 It is not such a strange idea. Think
of the esteem in which the British judicial classes of the time held themselves and their mode of
civilization, and of their willingness to impose it on others all over the world. Our forefathers too
seemed to have few doubts about their rectitude, or about imposing it upon those already here, or
dispossessing or disposing of them. That brooding omnipresence of morality was the source of the
principles governing common law decision-making.
One might think of it as a great river of wisdom and guidance into which judges dip in their
decisions. Of course no two cases are ever quite the same,73 but they commonly have similar contours.
You could say that of the river too: as in the old cliché, you can never bathe in the same river twice, but
nevertheless its banks, depth, current, temperature and viscosity are usually much the same the second
time as the first.

70

Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 222 (1917)(Holmes, J., dissenting); Letter from Oliver W. Holmes, Jr. to
Harold J. Laski (Jan.29, 1926), in HOLMES-LASKI LETTERS, 1926-1927, AT 822 (Mark DeWolfe Howe ed., 1953).
71
Blackstone, supra note __ at *41.
72
“[T]he customary law of England, which we doe likewise call ius commune, as comming neerest to the lawe of Nature,
which is the root and touchstone of all good lawes, and which also is ius non scriptum, and written onley in the memory of
man ... doth far excell our written lawes, namely our statutes or acts of Parliament.” Sir John Davies, LE PRIMER REPORT
DES CASES ET MATTERS EN LEY (1628), quoted by S.E.Thorne, The Equity of a Statute and Heydon's Case, 31 ILL. L.
REV. 202, 207 (1936).
73
Except in cases of res judicata, which might be considered the limiting case of stare decisis.
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A judge, then, would dip into this river of justice and declare the law he found: thus the
“declaratory” theory. So long as the judge had accurately perceived the applicable law, a subsequent
judge faced with a similar case should naturally follow his predecessor’s decision and decide in the same
way. But if the subsequent judge’s case was different in some significant aspect, then he would not be
expected to find and declare the same law.
There was no problem of retroactivity in the decision as the parties should also have taken their
guidance from that same source. But parties before a court then as now commonly disagreed about
what they found when they consulted that brooding omnipresence; hence their interaction’s becoming
legally contentious. Judges were seen as having a better perception of, perhaps even a privileged access
to the source of law. Blackstone saw it almost mystically:

“[T]he judges in the several courts of

justice … are the depositaries of the laws; the living oracles, who must decide in all cases of doubt, and
who are bound by an oath to decide according to the law of the land.”74 Hale gave four rather more
down to earth reasons for judicial authority:
First, because judges are chosen for their “greater Learning, Knowledge, and Experience in the
Laws than others. 2dly. Because they are upon their Oaths to judge according to the Laws of the
Kingdom. 3dly. Because they have the best Helps to inform their Judgments. 4thly. Because
they do Sedere pro Tribunali, and their Judgments are strengthened and upheld by the Laws of
this Kingdom, till they are by the same Law revers’d or avoided.”75
Judges, then, were held authoritative and they left their declarations in their opinions, to be followed by
their successors.76 But the authority did not extend beyond what was necessary for the decision, as only
to that extent did the judge inquire with the necessary concentration and effort.77

74

Blackstone, supra note at *69.
Hale, supra note __ at 45.
76
Blackstone:
[T]he monuments and evidences of our legal customs are contained in the records of the several courts of justice, in
books of reports and judicial decisions, and in the treatises of learned sages of the profession, preserved and handed
down to us from the times of highest antiquity … receive their binding power, and force of laws, by long and
immemorial usage, and by their universal reception throughout the kingdom.
Blackstone, supra note __ at **63-64 (contrasting acts of parliament which do not enjoy such authority.)
75
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But judges were not infallible. Their decisions did not make law; of mundane institutions, only a
legislature could do that.78 Their decisions were evidence of law, authoritative evidence but not
infallible: “[I]ndeed these judicial decisions are the principal and most authoritative evidence, that can
be given, of the existence of such custom as shall form a part of the common law.”79 Yet a subsequent
judge could find that his predecessor had been mistaken, that in the precedent case the court had
misperceived the moral blueprint in the sky; its decision was not “bad law, but … it was not law… .”80
On the declaratory theory a court did not and could not absolutely bind its successors.81
This differs from our current understanding of stare decisis. For example, the power to find a
precedent misguided was, and on the declaratory theory had to be, independent of the status of the
court.82 There was no distinction between vertical and horizontal stare decisis.83 Think of cases as
77

Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 399-400 (1821) (“If they go beyond the case, they may be respected, but
ought not to control the judgment in a subsequent suit when the very point is presented for decision. The reason of this
maxim is obvious. The question actually before the Court is investigated with care, and considered in its full extent. Other
principles which may serve to illustrate it, are considered in their relation to the case decided, but their possible bearing on all
other cases is seldom completely investigated.”)
78
Hale:
Judicial Decisions [are binding] between the parties thereto, yet they [judicial decisions] do not make a Law
properly so called, (for that only the King in Parliament can do); yet they have great Weight and Authority in
Expounding, Declaring, and Publishing what the law of this Kingdom is, especially when such Decisions hold a
Consonancy and Congruity with Resolutions and Decisions of former Times; and tho’ such Decisions are less than a
Law, yet they are a greater Evidence thereof than the Opinion of any private Persons, as such, whatsoever.
Hale, supra note __ at 45.
79
Blackstone, supra note __ at *69(“[I]n such cases the subsequent judges do not pretend to make a new law but to vindicate
the old one from misrepresentation.”); Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. 1, 18 (1842) Per Story, J. (“In the ordinary use of language it
will hardly be contended that the decisions of Courts constitute laws. They are, at most, only evidence of what the laws are;
and are not of themselves laws. They are often reexamined, reversed, and qualified by the Courts themselves, whenever they
are found to be either defective, or ill-founded, or otherwise incorrect.”)
80
Id, (italics in original).
81
Blackstone:
Yet this rule [to abide by precedents] admits of exception, where the former determination is most evidently
contrary to reason; much more if it be clearly contrary to the Divine law.. But even in such cases the subsequent
judges do not pretend to make a new law, but to vindicate the old one from misrepresentation.
Blackstone, supra note __ at *69.
82
In part this was because the hierarchical court structure was not well in place in the early development of the common
law. Theodore F.T. Plucknett, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW 350 (5th ed. 1956). Frederick G.
Kempin, Jr., Precedent and Stare Decisis: The Critical Years, 1800 to 1850, 3 AM.J.LEGAL HISTORY 28, 31-33 (1959).
But even with an hierarchy in place, precedent could transcend hierarchy; here is Justice Story citing a trial court opinion and
an appellate court’s reliance on it: “In the earliest case, Warren v. Lynch, 5 Johns. R. 289, the Supreme Court of New York
appear to have held, that a pre-existing debt was a sufficient consideration to entitle a bona fide holder without notice to
recover the amount of a note endorsed to him, which might not, as between the original parties, be valid. The same doctrine
was affirmed by Mr. Chancellor Kent in Bay v. Coddington, 5 Johns. Chan. Rep. 54.” Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. 1, 16
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analogous to observations or experiments in empirical science; they surely must follow natural law, but
the scientist and the entire state of scientific understanding might misperceive what that is. The
explanatory propositions of established science can be called into question by anybody, of no matter
what status; a clerk in a Swiss patent office could overrule the most influential scientists in prior history.
So too could a judge find a precedent in error no matter what the status of its author; so too can we, as
students of law, find a case to be “wrongly decided.”84
It wasn’t a very compelling notion of stare decisis. A prior decision was evidence of the law
only, not itself an instance of it, and as merely the effort of a judge, inherently fallible even as evidence.
As Lord Mansfield said “[t]he reason and spirit of cases make law; not the letter of particular
precedents.”85 To this we must add the uncertainty of the reporting system, especially in the new United
States. Reports here were few and not very reliable.86 The early ones were merely notes kept by
lawyers, sometimes published as a public service, but unofficial.87 Dallas’s reports of the United States’
Supreme Court decisions and of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court were “submitted to the public in 1790
as a collection of lawyers’ notes.”88 They also focused on the arguments of counsel rather than on the

(1842)(But one should note that Justice Story was also prepared to trace the point to Roman and 18th century English jurists:
“The law respecting negotiable instruments may be truly declared in the language of Cicero, adopted by Lord Mansfield in
Luke v. Lyde, 2 Burr. R. 883, 887, to be in a great measure, not the law of a single country only, but of the commercial
world.” Id at 19.)
83
The earliest court to draw the distinction was an ecclesiastical court, part of a religious system thoroughly familiar with
hierarchy, and even there quite late in coming. Veley and Joslin v. Burder, 1 Curt. 372, 163 Eng.Rep. 127 (Consistory Court
of London, 1837)
84
Justice Scalia says this "explains why first-year law school is so exhilarating: because it consists of playing the commonlaw judge, which in turn consists of playing king ... How exiting!" Antonin Scalia, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION 7
(1997). My impression is rather that it creates rampant insecurity, sending students scurrying for the shelter of black letter
study guides.
85
Fisher v. Prince, 97 Eng.Rep. 876, 876 (K.B. 1762).
86
Frederick G. Kempin, Jr., Precedent and Stare Decisis: The Critical Years, 1800 to 1850, 3 AM.J.LEGAL HISTORY 28,
34 (1959) (“While England had some reliable, though unofficial, reports during the 17th and 18th centuries, it is safe to say
that the colonists had none until the nineteenth century.”)
87
Martha J. Dragich, Will the Federal Courts of Appeals Perish if They Publish? Or Does the Declining Use of Opinions to
Explain and Justify Judicial Decisions Pose a Greater Threat? 44 AM.U.L.REV. 757, 773 (1995)( In the United States in the
late eighteenth through mid-nineteenth century recording of decisions was “unsystematic, idiosyncratic private reporting of
vastly increased numbers of cases.”)
88
Frederick G. Kempin, Jr., Precedent and Stare Decisis: The Critical Years, 1800 to 1850, 3 AM.J.LEGAL HISTORY 28,
34 (1959) (Johnson’s reports of New York decisions, 1799-1823 in 20 volumes, were similar. Id at n.21). Craig Joyce, The
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decisions of judges. In 1826, New York’s Chancellor Kent assessed “Even a series of decisions are
[sic] not always conclusive evidence of what is law …”89 That “transcendental body of law outside of
any particular State but obligatory within it unless and until changed by statute”90 remained supreme.
How does the declaratory theory account for the concept of super-precedent? Quite well, I think.
Those decisions that rest upon larger commonalities in moral precept and not subject to difference in
decision for minor variations would count. The major contours of the river, in that metaphor, or of the
brooding omnipresence in Holmes’ would not be variable except in cases of massive change in society.
Thus in Swift v. Tyson91 Justice Story could safely rely on Lord Mansfield’s decisions as unshakable
evidence of the natural law of commerce: discharge of a pre-existing debt counts as consideration.92
Probably few such “super-precedents” exist as cases: for example, it is unlikely that one could discover
the progenitor of the staple that one who deliberately chops off the limb of another is liable in tort; it is
one of those fundamentals that a society could scarcely survive without. Compare the tort of seduction,
and its early formulation in the writ of per quod servitium amissit, obsolete today even in states with
precedents surviving.93 But cases have pioneered seemingly unshakable doctrines, for example in
contract –think of the prohibition on unforeseeable consequential damages established in the super-

Rise of the Supreme Court Reporter: An Institutional Perspective on Marshall Court Ascendancy, 83 MICH.L.REV. 1291
(1985)(“Not a single formal manuscript opinion is known to have survived from the Court’s first decade; and few, if any,
may have existed for Dallas to draw upon. … Delay, expense, omission and inaccuracy: these were among the hallmarks of
Dallas’ work.” at 1305 (fn.s omitted).)[check]
89
James Kent, 1 COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW *477 /529 (1ST ed. 1826 [*] /this from the 7th ed., 1851
90
Black & White Taxicab Co. v. Brown & Yellow Taxicab Co., 276 U.S. 518, 533 (1928), Holmes, J., dissenting.
91
Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842)
92
Id at 19 (“The law respecting negotiable instruments may be truly declared in the language of Cicero, adopted by Lord
Mansfield in Luke v. Lyde, 2 Burr. R. 883, 887, to be in a great measure, not the law of a single country only, but of the
commercial world. Non erit alia lex Romae, alia Athenis, alia nunc, alia posthac, sed et apud omnes gentes, et omni tempore,
una eademque lex obtenebit.” Trans.: “There will be no other law of Rome, (no) other (law) of Athens, (no) other now, (no)
other in the future, but both in all countries and in all times, one and the same law shall obtain (apply).”)
93
Sinclair, Seduction and the Myth of the Ideal Woman, 5 LAW & INEQUALITY 33, 59-60 (1987)
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precedent, Hadley v. Baxendale94 --or in tort –think of the doctrine of “last clear chance” set down in the
super-precedent Davies v. Mann.95

Section 3: Langdell’s quasi scientific scholasticism.
The declaratory theory didn’t last, of course. It couldn’t last.96

The underpinnings of the

brooding omnipresence in the sky were in trouble by the early 19th century, coming under attack from
pioneer positivists Jeremy Bentham and John Austin. Austin, not always boring, called it “the childish
fiction employed by our judges, that judiciary or common law is not made by them, but is a miraculous
something made by nobody, existing, I suppose, from eternity, and merely declared from time to time
by the judges.”97
Urbanization along with the industrial revolution in England and immigration from diverse
origins in the United States must have shaken faith in the universality of that transcendental body of law
declared by judges. It wasn’t enough to talk, as did Bacon,98 of the river of justice flowing through
different topology and taking on local color. Even Blackstone doubted that the common law of England
could rule in places as different as “[o]ur American plantations.”99 If the differences in circumstance
94

9 Exch. 341 (1854)
10 M.& W. 543, 152 Eng. Rep. 588 (1842)
96
But it never quite went away, either. Even on the most elevated of benches it occasionally finds a proponent; see, e.g.
Harper v. Virginia, 509 U.S. 86, 102 et seq (1993)(Scalia, J., concurring). In the last century we saw much the same idea,
although without the claim to universality, in the super-organic theory of culture of anthropologists Leslie White and
Theodore Kroeber. Even postmodern theorists posit much the same; just substitute ‘culture’ or ‘morality’ for ‘discourse’ in
the following from Michel Foucault: “In short, it is a matter of depriving the subject (or its substitute) of its role as originator
and of analyzing the subject as a variable and complex function of discourse.” Michel Foucault, What Is An Author?', in
David Lodge, ed., MODERN CRITICISM AND THEORY 209 (1988), (‘discourse’ is, in pomobabble, a universal
placeholder for whatever you like as a determinant.)[or in David Richter, ed., THE CRITICAL TRADITION, 899 (1998).
97
John Austin, LECTURES ON JURISPRUDENCE, 634 (R. Campbell, ed. London, 1885)
98
Francis Bacon, perhaps the greatest of all jurisprudential thinkers (I reckon he was) used the image of a river explicitly in
accounting for the adaptability of justice to circumstance:
And as veins of water acquire diverse flavors and qualities according to the nature of the soil through which they
flow and percolate, just so in these legal systems natural equity is tinged and stained by the accidental forms of
circumstances, according to the site of territories, the disposition of peoples, and the nature of commonwealths.
Spedding and Heath, VI THE WORKS OF FRANCIS BACON 418 (London, 1857-74); Daniel R. Coquillette, FRANCIS
BACON 288 (Stanford U.P., Stanford, 1992).
99
Blackstone, supra note __ at **107-08:
95
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were not just of geography and technological development but also of culture, the moral blueprint’s
universality as a source could scarcely survive: Different cultures handled stock social problems
differently, and as effectively as the British upper classes.
In the United States the federal court system was set up with an hierarchical structure; with
hierarchy goes power, flowing top down. Judicial hierarchy brought vertical stare decisis with its
compulsive power over lower courts, independently of wisdom or rationality. Supreme court decisions
were not merely evidence of law, to a lower court judge they were the law, with a controlling power
akin to legislation. Most states followed the federal model.100 The development of a reliable system of
reports facilitated judicial reliance on prior decisions.101

“The movement toward official state reporters

gained momentum in the 1840s and 1850s and was shortly universal.”102
American common law jurisprudence probably settled again only after the Civil War and the
advent of the first modern law schools. Christopher Columbus Langdell, dean of Harvard Law School,
and his successor James Barr Ames brought a revolution not only to legal education with the case

[I]t hath been held that if an uninhabited country be discovered and planted by English subjects, all the English laws
then in being … are immediately in force. But this must be understood with very many and very great restrictions.
Such colonists carry with them only so much of the English law as is applicable to their own situation and the
condition of an infant colony; such, for instance, as the general rules of inheritance, and of protection from personal
injuries. The artificial refinements and distinctions incident to the property of a great and commercial people, the
laws of police and revenue (such, especially, as are enforced by penalties), the mode of maintenance for the
established clergy, the jurisdiction of spiritual courts, and a multitude of other provisions, are neither necessary nor
convenient for them, and therefore are not in force. What shall be admitted, and what rejected, at what times, and
under what restrictions, must, in case of dispute, be decided in the first instance by their own provisional judicature,
subject to the revision and control of the king in council … . Our American plantations are principally of this latter
sort. … And, therefore, the common law of England as such has no allowance or authority there; they being no part
of the mother country, but distinct (though dependent) dominions.
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method but also to the doctrine of stare decisis.103 Langdell was devoted to books. Hitherto it had been
thought that the best training for the legal practitioner was in practice, drawing a
false analogy between medical education and legal education. … Medicine can be learned only
from the bodies of the sick and wounded; law, on the other hand, ‘is to be learned exclusively
from the books in which its principles and precedents are recorded, digested, and explained.’
The place to find these principles and precedents, of course, was not the courtroom but the
library.104
But this wasn’t a pure reversion to scholasticism; it was scholasticism dressed up as science. If “the
opinions of judges and lawyers as to what the law is are the law,”105 then one could take those opinions
as data –as a scientist might take observations or specimens or the results of experiments in the
laboratory –and generate an explanation, a general law.
According to Samuel Williston … Ames “believed it to be the function of the lawyer, and
especially of the teacher of law, to weld from the decisions a body of mutually consistent and
coherent principles. To his mind there was but one right principle upon a given point, and if the
decisions failed to recognize it, so much the worse for the decisions.”106
This is not the simplistic “rule of the case” of the “enactment theory”; 107 individual decisions were not
law, but a collection of decisions on a topic made law of a force equivalent to a statute.
Langdell’s jurisprudence was unabashedly formalistic:108it rested on principles laid down by
judges and discoverable from their opinions. “Law, considered as a science, consists of certain
principles and doctrines” and “the number of fundamental legal doctrines is much less than is commonly
supposed.”109 One synthesizes the relevant principles and deduces the solution to a problem. It is an
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inherently conservative conception: words of decisions from the past, not present social needs and
values, are the data on which the judge bases “the rule.” Thus, Langdell’s conception is so intrinsically
opposed to change that even statutes fell before it: “the landmark decisions of the formalist age are
those which strike down laws regulating business or protecting workers.”110
How does Langdell’s quasi empiricist formalism account for the concept of super-precedent? At
a first pass one would say “quite well.” It generates rules by abstraction from sets of cases rather than
particular progenitor decisions, super-precedents, but it has that in common with the declaratory theory.
Those sets of cases give us the legal categories for which we have names, the analogues of species or
genera: “battery”, “tort” and the like. Yet Marbury would hold up as a super-precedent because it
spawned lines of uncritical followers; taking the back-bearings from its progeny one can formulate a
generalization no different from Chief Justice Marshall’s “It is emphatically the province …”. So too
would Hadley v. Baxendale.
The problem is rather that this theory of stare decisis would not seem able to distinguish superprecedent from common garden precedent or any gradation in between. Where cases from the past are
in disarray on a topic, one simply could not form a rule; there would be no supportable abstraction.
Between formal control of the present problem and no control at all, it does not provide a mechanism for
introducing alternative sources of authority, such as adaptivity to current circumstances.
As the basis of a teaching method, Langdell’s formalism may have worked quite well; it is still in
use today. But as a justification for stare decisis it is insupportable. Even though it keeps its eye fixed
firmly on the past, it does not solve the problem of retroactivity: in those areas of behavior in which no
ordinary denizen –and no sane lawyer –would check prior cases before acting, its rule of law may still
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come as a surprise. At first glance, it may appear to offer a modicum of certainty, reliability, and
predictability, but that too is illusory. Legal historian A.W.B.Simpson:
. . . it is a feature of the common law system that there is no way of settling the correct text or
formulation of the rules, so that it as a single rule in what Pollock called "any authentic form of
words." … [I]f six pundits of the profession, however sound and distinguished, are asked to write
down what they conceive to be the rule or rules governing the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, the
definition of murder or manslaughter, the principles governing frustration of contract or mistake
as to the person, it is in the highest degree unlikely that they will fail to write down six different
rules or sets of rules.111
Of course. There are indefinitely many true explanations of any set of data,112 so indefinitely many
“laws” so-called will fit a set of cases, or a single opinion, and none is more authoritative than another.
If the situation is in any way out of the ordinary, how can a lawyer advise, or a client act with
confidence on their choice among hypotheses? Finally, with the theory’s focus on the past comes
resistance to change, a wooden rigidity inhibiting adaptation to the needs of a changing society.
Common law and stare decisis could not have endured for so long and through such varied
circumstances had it been built only on such ground.
The legal world might have been excused for swallowing Langdell’s theory of precedent at the
time. The two to three decades following the Civil War in the United States was a period of social
insecurity, not only as a consequence of the war but also from industrialization, urbanization and rapid
development in technology.113 It was hardly surprising that the judges sought an extremely formalistic
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jurisprudence; in rules lies security.114 But of course it couldn’t last. Even as Langdell and Ames got
the game going at Harvard, their sometime junior colleague Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr. was writing
subversively:
The official theory is that each new decision follows syllogistically from existing precedents.
But as precedents survive like the clavicle of the cat, long after the use they once served is at an
end, and the reason for them has been forgotten, the result of following them must often be
failure and confusion from the merely logical point of view.115
Courts, according to Holmes, hade power to adapt the law to “[t]he felt necessities of the time.”116 With
the technological developments and their commensurate changes in social relations pressing at the
beginning of the twentieth century, he had a point, didn’t he?
But if not Langdell’s quasi scientific scholasticism, and not the brooding omnipresence in the
sky, then what?

Section 4: 20th Century theories
(a) The enactment theory.
One persistent, formalistic offshoot of Langdell’s theory is the “enactment theory”:
Judges, when they decide particular cases at common law, lay down general rules that are
intended to benefit the community in some way. Other judges, deciding later cases, must
therefore enforce these rules so that the benefit may be achieved.117
The power of stare decisis follows simply from the decision’s making a rule: “This may be called the
'School-rules concept' of law, and it more or less assimilates all law to statute law.”118 Despite its
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manifest inadequacies, the enactment theory is popular in law schools, the ‘R’ in the briefing formula
“IRAC.”119
I shall not reiterate the manifold deficiencies of the enactment theory here,120 but focus only on
those peculiarly relevant to the concept of super-precedent. First, notice that even if there were a rule
enacted in a case, nobody can say with authority just what are the words of that rule. But, as we all
know from our struggles with statutes, the actual words used in a rule make vital differences. As lawyers
and students of law we are entitled –empowered --to dispute any claim to authority in a particular
formulation. But how is the poor denizen, untrained in law, unable even to find the case, to find a
reliable rule, be it in super or mere mundane precedent? Supposing that a rule is only created when a
court decides the case requires accepting both retroactivity and an intrinsic lack of notice, not a viable
solution.
Stare decisis on the enactment theory is simply explained: A case enacts a rule, and that rule
governs not only behavior but future judicial decisions.121 But it is in this reliance on the concept of rule
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that the enactment theory and super-precedent find incompatibilities.122 A rule governs until repealed,
i.e., if judicially enacted, until it is overruled.

But overrulings are rare, dramatic events, and new

situations requiring new or different treatments abound. Distinguishing the old rule, the rule from the
precedent case, and thus creating a new rule would seem no different whether one is dealing with superprecedent or mundane; a rule is still and only a rule.
One way the enactment theory accommodates to adaptive necessity is by allowing a subsequent
court to modify –extend, narrow, create an exception to –the precedent rule of the prior case. But then
not only does the rule of the prior become utterly unreliable as a guide, it is jurisprudentially
inconsequential”: the exigencies of the social and moral circumstances rather than the precedent “rule”
determine the new case’s outcome, just as they underpin the modified –“amended”? --rule. Thus the
“R” in “I-R-A-C” stands also for “Redundant.”
To preserve any semblance of empirical accuracy or jurisprudential adequacy, enactment theory
must allow subsequent courts to make new, variant rules to govern new, variant situations. From this
starting point, Professor Farber argues on pragmatic grounds that the enactment theory is unworkable in
itself and incompatible with the concept of super-precedent (“bedrock precedents” in his locution.123)
The proliferation of rules will, in practice, lead to “more fractured courts, with fewer majority opinions.
… This makes rules more brittle than standards, since they cannot be bent but only broken and recast.
Thus, because a rule is less flexible than a standard, it is less likely to maintain the allegiance of later
judges.”124 As a practical matter, then, “Rules have a way of weathering poorly as precedents”;125 they

122

To function as a prescriptive rule a string of words should, at a minimum, be general (i.e., having at least one common
noun phrase), be expressed in an accessible, identifiable and canonical verbal formula, having authority independent of the
grounds for its enactment. See Sinclair, What is the ‘R’ in ‘IRAC’? supra note __ at 459-63.
123
Farber, supra n__ at 1176, 1180 et seq.
124
Id, citing Kathleen M. Sullivan, Foreword: The Justices of Rules and Standards, 106 Harv. L. Rev. 22, 90 (1992).
125
Id [Farber, supra n__ ] at 1201.

27

will tend to be reformulated at a higher level of abstraction, commonly called “standards.”126 Standards
provide less precision in guidance, which “undercuts the very stability that stare decisis was supposed to
provide.”127 Yet flexibility and adaptivity in application demand the sacrifice.128 On this argument,
then, the enactment theory fails; and, because on it they would be enacted rules, so also fails the notion
of super-precedent. “There are limits to how much a court, especially in a constitutional case, can act
like a legislature, laying down clear rules that will govern the future.”129
On the general social level, in the twentieth century society neither wanted nor needed a
jurisprudence entrenched in the past. Technological and social change came apace, and the conception
of precedent in judging moved with it. In 1920 Judge Cardozo was properly derisive of rule-bound
conceptions of stare decisis: “Their notion of their duty is to match the colors of the case at hand against
the colors of many sample cases spread out upon their desk. The sample nearest in shade supplies the
applicable rule. But, of course, no system of living law can be evolved by such process, and no judge of
a high court, worthy of his office, views the function of his place so narrowly.”130

(b) Legal Realism
The end of World War I ushered in a period of great confidence in the United States, and with it
change in many aspects of society. “Historians have long recognized that, for better or for worse,
American culture was remade in the 1920’s. Robust with business styles, technologies, educational
policies, manners, and leisure habits which are identifiably our own, the decade sits solidly at the base of
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our culture.” 131 A confident judiciary, less interested in the security of purported stability,132 reshaped
the law to suit. Jurisprudential theory matched.
Holmes had long since laid a foundation for diminished precedential power. But the legal realist
school that followed in his wake gave us not so much a theory as an anti-theory of precedent. How can
a precedent case control a current decision? A case is a particular decision and from one particular,
nothing follows.133 If one tries to generalize a particular decision, there are indefinitely many ways one
can do so.134 For which of the particular referential expressions in the precedent does one substitute a
common noun, and in choosing that common noun, of what generality?135 Even the proliferation of
precedents was seen as adding indeterminacy,136 as had been forecast by Chancellor Kent.137 Jerome
Frank argued that opinions seldom reveal the actual basis of decision,138 so what courts purporting to
follow precedent “in fact do is manipulate the language of former decisions” to suit their own, chosen
ends.139 But this is only harmful insofar as it misleading, a pretense to follow precedent. Judges’ openly
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questioning past decisions is as it should be: “It is, I think, a healthy practice (too infrequently followed)
for a court to re-examine its own doctrine.”140
These arguments amount to a rejection of stare decisis as a source of law. How can one take
guidance from past decisions when they may at any time be reinterpreted, narrowed, expanded,
distinguished or discredited by a court? As a theory it amounts to no more than saying “following
precedent is what judges may say they do” but stare decisis in reality does not limit judicial discretion.
Perhaps nobody actually went so far as to say quite that, but it is the output of the arguments. And of
course as a matter of reality it was never accurate: judges did see themselves as confined by precedent,
and lawyers, even devoted legal realist lawyers, continued to cite, rely on, and distinguish precedent
cases in their arguments in court.
How would legal realism account for super-precedent? With skepticism, one might think, or
rejection. If a judge need only be constrained by precedent if she chose, how could some precedents
deny that choice? Why should it be more difficult to manipulate than language of one precedent than
another? But, one suspects, one case might count as the realists’ super-precedent: Marbury v. Madison
in its assertion that it is for the judiciary to say what the law is certainly accords with their philosophy.

(c) Legal Process
Like everything else, fashions in jurisprudence have moved more quickly, changed more rapidly
since the middle of last century. And every new fad left us with new insights –well, perhaps not every
fad: the brief flare of postmodernism may have passed without, one hopes, leaving a scar. And
jurisprudence has become ever more sophisticated, and commensurately less informative. For present
purposes, one more significant variant deserves mention.
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In the 1950s we had the “Legal Process” school based on the wonderful introductory text book
THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF THE
LAW by Professors Henry M. Hart, Jr., and Albert M. Sacks.141 They look at law from the points of
view of those actively engaged in it, basically lawyers and judges. This means its study of stare decisis
is through many exemplary problems and cases followed by probing questions. But they do provide a
capsule summary, “A Tentative Formulation of the Bases of the Doctrine of Stare Decisis.”142 It is a list
of values similar to those in Section 1, above. But it adds reasons peculiar to the practitioner’s
viewpoint; for example:
1. In furtherance of private ordering –
(c) The desirability of encouraging the remedial processes of private settlement by minimizing
the incentives of the parties to try to secure from a different judge a different decision than has
been given by the same or other judges in the past.
On enhancement of the legitimacy of the judiciary it is excellent:
3. In furtherance of public confidence in the judiciary –
(a) The desirability of maximizing the acceptability of decisions, and the importance to this end
of popular and professional confidence in (1) the impersonality of decisions and (2) their
reasoned foundation, as manifested both by the respect accorded to them by successor judges and
by their staying power.143
As a theory this is limited. A posteriori it explains why, once we had stare decisis, we continued
with it, even after its initial theoretical justification was no longer viable. Because it does not show how
stare decisis derives from more fundamental bases, it does not unify disparate data or distinguish the
inappropriate. As we have seen, there are values countervailing those on the list. For example, would it
be desirable for all disputes to be settled privately under prior, maladaptive precedents? Surely not; so
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there are limits on “1….(c)” above. What limits? A theory should generate at least the basis of an
answer. So the list of values served does not tell us how to go on from here, how to evaluate new
situations. For example, what can a list of values served tell us about super-precedent?
Any candidate super-precedent began as a landmark decision, the pioneer in its domain. How
could the attorney for a party have used it in settlement negotiations? Would that landmark decision
increase the “professional confidence” in the judiciary of the attorney who advised her client according
to the rule it displaced? But on the other hand, once established, the super-precedent’s unshakable status
serves the “this end of popular and professional confidence” (“3…(a)” above) and is based in “the
respect accorded to them by successor judges and by their staying power.”144
The legal process approach shared a problem with all the theories we have looked at in this
section: it focuses too much on what lawyers and judges do, and not enough on the ordinary denizen.
The ordinary denizen’s behavioral options are limited by the law. If precedent has power over legal
decision-makers, then it also has power over everyone in the jurisdiction. But how is the ordinary
person, without legal training, to know of or find out about a controlling precedent? Very few people in
normal life are able to find cases,145 and only for very special decisions ought others have to hire such a
person to do it for them. A person cannot be bound by a law of which he or she has no notice.146 How
could a person follow a rule if she didn’t know it? As Jeremy Bentham said: “That a law may be
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obeyed, it is necessary that it should be known … that it may be known, it is necessary that it be
promulgated.”147
The problems of notice and retroactivity are a general explanatory burden for theories of
common law in general and stare decisis in particular. The declaratory theory carries the burden:
everyone has access to the moral blueprint in the sky. Sure, it was really the morality of a specially
trained, elite that really set the standards. But the English upper classes never had any difficulty
endorsing their own rectitude; why should others be held to a lesser standard?148 Since that
“transcendental body of law outside of any particular State”149 is the universal moral guide, it tells
everyone how to behave; legal advisors may use cases to help see it, but the brooding omnipresence is
the ultimate guide. In contrast, the 20th century theories discussed in this section fail to cast any light on
these problems.

Section 5: The Standard Theory
Let’s step back a moment. Law has the task of reconciling the interests of the individual with the
interests of society. Legislatures do this by formulating, enacting and promulgating rules, authoritative
strings of words, which confine the scope of action of the individuals governed. How does common law
do it? A common law decision arises out of a clash of interests of individuals, antecedent to the
decision. Other than in ending a dispute, how does the decision of that private clash serve the interests
society?
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It is easy to see how one can guide one’s actions by statute law: even if the possibility of
actually finding and reading the whole of some of today’s legislative products is a bit remote, it is still
sufficiently possible to support the myth that one could have actual notice. You cannot say that of
common law decisions. Statutes operate prospectively,150 so a person contemplating action can take
notice of applicable constraints. Not so common law decisions; one acts first, and learns to one’s cost of
one’s error much later.151 How can that be just?
Stare decisis tells us that a prior case similar to this one should be followed in this decision. But,
except in cases of res judicata, no two cases are the same; one can always find a difference.152 On the
other hand, no cases are completely different either; one can always find some similarity.153 Whether a
prior case is similar to or distinguishable from a case at hand depends entirely on the criterion of
similarity.154
Where does the judge find the properly applicable criterion of similarity? Professor Corbin
answered with a list, similar to Holmes’s most famous paragraph155:
The [judge’s] rules come from all possible sources – from constitutions and statutes; from the
decisions of other judges; from legal writers, ancient and modern, and in this and other countries;
from books of religion and morality; from general principles of right and wrong in which the
judge was trained from his youth up; from the rules of action customarily followed in the
community, lately referred to by Lord Chancellor Haldane as Sittlichkeit; from the judge’s own
practice and interest and desire.156
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“Sittlichkeit”: “the prevailing sense of justice and the mores of the community;”157 pretty much what
Llewellyn called “situation sense.”158 Inescapably Holmes and Corbin and Llewellyn all include the
judge’s own perceptions of propriety. How could it be otherwise? Judges’ evaluations of what elements
are critical, and among them which more so than others, obviously must vary inter se. Otherwise
there’d be no dissents. Otherwise we wouldn’t take so seriously the elevation of a judge to the Supreme
Court. Otherwise judges wouldn’t be human.
Criteria of similarity are reasons. Judges give reasons in their opinions, and of course in the
great majority of cases they simply follow precedent. In significant cases, the ones Holmes and Corbin
and Llewellyn are concerned with, the ones that set new law, the sources of those reasons are exogenous
to the law. 159 Morality, politics, economics, social policy and technology develop outside of the law
itself (even though judicial decisions can influence them), and judges have no authority over them.
In an opinion, the court recites a set of sentences as the facts of the case and for the last hundred
and fifty years these facts have been beyond dispute; and the final decision too cannot be contested. But
the justification connecting the two, the reasons for the decision on those facts, carries no such intrinsic
authority, no horizontal power of stare decisis. 160 “…the unwritten law proceeds, not from the will of
the judge as lawmaker, but from society speaking through him.”161 The author of the opinion carries no
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intrinsic weight on the validity or relevance of the justificatory argument (although obviously enough
great judges, who became great by their acute sensitivity to social mores and ability to articulate them
well, bring persuasive power in virtue of that greatness.)
Retrospectively we substitute reasons, saying “we can reconcile –or distinguish --this case on the
theory that …” and by ‘theory’ mean reasons for the decision. We all have the power and authority to
contest the reasons given in an opinion and the theory produced.162 Indeed, one of the virtues of
common law is its encouragement of the production of alternative explanatory theories, not only by
writers in law reviews, but by advocates who must present theories to distinguish or rely on prior cases.
This proliferation of theories has a positive adaptive value, more readily providing for change in law to
keep up with change in society. As Lord Goff put it, "common lawyers worship at the shrine of the
working hypothesis.”163
It is thus that the common law adapts to a changing world and serves the interests of society.164
Legislators are elected to serve the interest of the public and do so –to the extent they do –through
legislation. Judges in common law decisions draw on the values of society in their reasoning, and adapt
that reasoning to social needs, thus also serving the interests of the public, even though effected through
particular decisions. “The outstanding truths of life, the great and unquestioned phenomena of society,
are not to be argued away as myths or vagaries when they do not fit within our little moulds. If
necessary, we must remake the moulds.”165

important principle which is developed by litigation is in fact and at bottom the result of more or less definitely understood
views of public policy.”); John Austin, THE PROVINCE OF JURISPRUDENCE DETERMINED etc, 163 (New York
1954)(1st ed. 1832) (custom and positive morality are the “grounds of judicial decisions upon cases.”)
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745, 752 (1997)
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Adapting to present needs of society does not require a judicial disregard of precedent;166 rather,
judges take the old rules and give them new justifications, bringing different cases under their ambit
until they looked like different rules.167 Thus evolutionary drift, not revolution, is the more common
method, allowing precedent to constrain judicial decisions but not too greatly in discord with the
requirements of society.168 And judges have ample means of limiting the harmful effects of cases
which, when “manifestly out of accord with modern conditions of life …should not be followed.”169
“But,” comes the immediate objection, “what about the reliance interest which stare decisis
serves only if strictly followed?” The first response is purely logical: following a prior case on the
criterion of similarity set down in its reasoning is stare dictis not stare decisis. Replace the prior
opinion’s reasons with those conducive to current needs and perhaps the so-called precedent will be seen
as distinguished, or will find a more congenial set of progeny. Stare decisis is not mechanical; that a
case stands as precedent requires justification, and again on values exogenous to the immediate law.170
The more cogent approach is to recognize the importance of reliance as a societal value, where it
is a societal value. But only where it is a relevant value: too often we trot it out as though universal,171
where in very many cases it is not. Think of commonplace interpersonal interaction or everyday
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contracting, the stuff of basic tort law and Article II contracts: only a very, very small proportion of
those engaged in such behavior know of the governing cases (or the statute governing sales of goods)
and among that few, who thinks of the law? Does anyone consult counsel about whether one may
negligently inflict emotional distress? So, we should distinguish those behavioral domains in which we
do rely on the law in choosing a course of action –“reliance domains” –from those in which we do not
and should not have to –“non-reliance domains.”172
In reliance domains, notice taken from precedent cases and relied upon is a significant value in
judicial decision-making. Lord Mansfield:
In all mercantile transactions the great object should be certainty: and therefore, it is of more
consequence that a rule should be certain, than whether the rule is established one way or the other.
Because speculators in trade then know what ground to go upon.173
Mercantile transactions are paradigmatic reliance domains. Justice Douglas adds other planning areas:
“Uniformity and continuity in law are necessary to many activities. … contracts, wills, conveyances and
securities…Stare decisis provides some moorings so that men may trade and arrange their affairs with
confidence.”174 In such cases courts are, as they should be, very reluctant to make retrospective
changes.175 The appropriate course of action is to notice the maladaptivity but rather than overrule, to
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say it is the prerogative of the legislature to make a change in such settled law.176 Reliance is a very
powerful social interest.
But in non-reliance domains reliance is not a value of significance. Where people act according
to societal decencies, custom, and mores, and without seeking legal guidance, they should be held only
to the standards current in the society. “The constant assumption runs throughout the law that the
natural and spontaneous evolutions of habit fix the limits of right and wrong.”177 In such behavioral
domains, a judge serves societal interests by resolving the interpersonal dispute according to the
standards of decency that prevailed at the time and place of the action giving rise to the dispute.
But on this account, what is the use of stare decisis? Aren’t courts simply to decide according to
the standards prevalent in society at the time, including reliance as an important standard where
appropriate? Well no, and that is because there really are differences among judges, just as among all
the rest of as, as to what are the more important values and standards of behavior. If decisions were
unconstrained by precedent, then each judge could decide according to her perception of propriety in
social intercourse. In other words the judge could decide differently from a prior judge simply because
she disagreed, or thought herself wiser, smarter, more moral, or better informed. If that were the case,
then we would truly have a government of men and not of laws. But under stare decisis a judge may not
justifiably modify or overrule a precedent unless she can show that the world has changed in a manner
relevant to the behavior in question. Stare decisis thus provides a presumption that a precedent will be
followed unless the court demonstrates sufficient exogenous change in the relevant social world to
overcome the intrinsic value of stability and continuity.
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Here is a simple and clear example. To be valid, a patent must be novel, embody an original
idea; accordingly it must not have been anticipated in a “printed publication.”178 But what is a printed
publication for these purposes? In particular, would a microfilm of a German patent application on file
in the Library of Congress count? In 1958 the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals (now called the
Federal Circuit) faced that question in Application of Tenney,179 but with the additional fact that the
relevant microfilm had been wrongly indexed in the library’s catalogue.180 The court held that “printed
publication” meant as in books, journals and the like, requiring considerable production expense and to
provide a reasonably substantial circulation.181 Microfilm was as inexpensive per copy for a single issue
as for many, not requiring and in this case not receiving wide distribution, so it was held not to count as
“printed publication.”182 Notice that the erroneous indexing is of no relevance to the reasoning; only
circulation counted. A mere eight years later in I.C.E.Corp. v. Armco Steel Corp.,183 the district court
for the southern district of New York faced the very same question, except that the microfilm this time
had been correctly indexed. On the reasoning of Tenney the indexing is irrelevant, the decision must be
the same. Under the enactment theory or Langdell’s theory the outcome is easy: the microfilm is not a
“printed publication.” But no: in the eight years separating the cases, the technology of distribution of
microfilms had sufficiently advanced to make Library of Congress microfilm patent applications more
readily and widely accessible. Were this not to count as a printed publication a person might take such
an idea, gain a patent, and reap where he has not sown.184 Accessibility is the key to the reasoning.
Tenney is easily distinguished by the fact –irrelevant to its decision –that the microfilm had been
178
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erroneously indexed, thus not discoverable.185 The change in the technological world of microfilm
accessibility brought with it a change in the court’s reasoning and a change in the meaning of “printed
publication” for these purposes.
How big a change is necessary? Of course we fight over the answer; it differentiates
conservatives (in the traditional sense) from liberals (in the American sense.) This is the tension
between wisdom handed down from the past and the rationality of the present.186 But generally that
tension is not very great. Most of our law is very stable; basic torts have been with us for our entire
history; we just expand into new fields as we recognize new harms or the social significance of old ones.
Basic contracts similarly. The above example is especially apt because the relevant change was
technological, large, and in a short period of time. Most societal change is relatively sedate. Think of
the change in sexual mores and society’s willingness to interfere that has brought the changes in our
constitutional right to privacy in interpersonal relationships: Griswold v. Connecticut187 started it in
1965, and it has taken nearly forty years to work through to the constitutional protection of sodomy.188
The conundrums of common law notice and retroactivity are similarly resolved. In reliance
behavioral domains, where a party has, with or without professional assistance, taken notice of and acted
in reliance on prior decisions, that reliance is a significant, often overwhelming value. Those are the
kinds of action in which “one of the first things for a court to remember is that people care more to know
that the rules of the game will be stuck to, than to have the best possible rules.”189 But in all that
everyday interpersonal behavior, in which we act without thinking of the law, in which it would be
utterly inappropriate to consult statute or precedent, we take our standards from the prevailing culture.
185
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In other words we take notice from society, and should only be held to have violated the law when we
have transgressed society’s standards of reasonable decency. Those are exactly the standards that
judges, too, should draw upon in deciding cases,190 whether by determining the application of precedent
or out of whole cloth.191 There is no retroactivity in such a decision.192
How does the standard theory account for the concept of super-precedent? A super-precedent is
one where the change in society would have to be very, very great for it to come into question. Marbury
v. Madison is paradigmatic: the change in socio-legal culture necessary for Marbury no longer to suit
our needs would be so great that we would no longer recognize it as the United States.193 Brown v.
Board of Education194 should be another. Unlike Marbury v. Madison, the contrary of Brown is easy to
envision; we just have to look to our history before it. But society now recognizes the moral abhorrence
of that state of affairs, and would surely find a return to it socially repulsive. Erie Railroad v.
Tompkins,195 is another example, nicely illustrating the fundamental change in societal thinking since
“the collapse of the authority of theology and scholastic metaphysics”:196 no longer could morality,
politics and law be founded in the universal brooding omnipresence of Swift v. Tyson,197 so the universal
federal common law had to go. To reverse that change would require a revolution in social
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epistemology of Enlightenment scale.198 Miranda v. Arizona199 is another example. In 1974, then
Justice Rehnquist, writing for a minimal majority in Michigan v. Tucker,200 had been overtly hostile to
Miranda, minimizing its impact. By 2000, however, without changing his own view he had to concede
that “Miranda has become embedded in routine police practice to the point where the warnings have
become part of our national culture”201 and thus, in effect, immune from overruling, a super-precedent.
It is sometimes said that when a case is affirmed many times, that increases its value, even makes
it a super-precedent.202 This would fit Langdell’s theory of precedent. But it is wrong. A case is only
affirmed or upheld when it comes into question.

As Max Radin said “Indeed, the fact that a case is in

the reports is in itself evidence that when the situation arose, the law was uncertain, in spite of
generations during which stare decisis has been dominant.”203 Being upheld many times means the
precedent has been questioned many times. Being cited many times does not.204 A case may be cited
for many reasons, including the intellectual honesty of acknowledging a foundational presupposition.
Marbury v. Madison for example, has been a foundational icon for two hundred years, unchallenged an
unchallengeable. (Indeed, the idea of challenging it would be seen as a reductio ad absurdum on one’s
argument.) It may be often cited, but only because it is a presupposition of so many arguments; it is
never challenged and so doesn’t get upheld. Erie Railroad v. Tompkins, although somewhat younger, is
similarly foundational, citable and cited.
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Here one can see the idea of super-precedent as the extreme of precedential power: a superprecedent stands for a fundamental pillar of social structure. Other cases may be powerful, but not of
that stature. According to the substantiality of change in society necessary to bring it into question, a
case could be evaluated on a gradation, from weak, temporary, ad hoc, through major to super
precedent.
Does Calder v. Bull205 (interpreting the Constitution’s ban on retroactivity206 to apply only to
criminal legislation) count as super-precedent? It was a problematic decision when made and its justice
and efficiency have been suspect ever since,207 but it has been used and relied upon by legislatures for
more than two centuries.208 Changing it would not greatly disturb reliance interests in the general
public, but on the other hand it has worked itself into the fabric of our law. It must be marginal,
powerful but not unshakable. Would Federal Baseball Club v. National League of Professional
Baseball Clubs209 (holding baseball not to be a business, thus not in violation of anti-trust laws for its
many restraints on trade) count? The Supreme Court itself seemed to think so, but perhaps only because
of the legislature’s thirty years of acquiescence.210 For baseball to fall from its favored pinnacle as our
national sport would be a change, but not so very great … would it?
Of course this discussion arises in the context of the right to terminate a pregnancy and the status
of Roe v. Wade211 and its successor in principle, Planned Parenthood v. Casey.212 Some would like the
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sequence to be considered unchallengeable. But there is a significant portion of the population213
ardently against permitting a woman to control her own reproductive function, significant enough to
influence elections. Judicial sensitivity to societal demands thus puts the adaptivity of Roe v. Wade in
question as it is repeatedly challenged in state legislation. It can hardly be called a super-precedent.
Gregg v. Georgia,214 the 1976 decision in which the Supreme Court reinstated the death penalty
as constitutional has had a similar history. It has survived at least as many appellate challenges as Roe v.
Wade, and yet we would not be inclined to call it a super-precedent. These challenges, coming not from
legislatures but from the significant proportion of society215 seeing the retributive killing of criminals as
a moral blot on our system of justice, similarly show Gregg v. Georgia to of uncertain adaptivity to the
needs of present society.

Section 6: ‘Super-precedent’ in Senatiorial Hearings
Stare decisis was on the minds of the Senate Judiciary Judiciary Committee when it interrogated
Judge Roberts on September 12-15, 2005. Chairman Specter even went so far as to rehearse quotable
definitions, to which Roberts added, making a thorough list of the doctrine’s virtues.216 The point was to
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216
Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of John G. Roberts, Jr. to be Chief Justice of the United States: Hearing Before
the S.Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 144, ___ (2005)(“Roberts’ Hearings”)[Specter]:
… I begin collaterally with the issue of stare decisis and the issue of precedents.
Black's Law Dictionary defines stare decisis as ``let the decision stand, to adhere to precedents
and not to unsettle things which are established.'' Justice Scalia articulated, ``The principal purpose
of stare decisis is to protect reliance interests and further stability in the law.''
Justice Frankfurter articulated the principle, ``We recognize that stare decisis embodies an
important social policy. It represents an element of continuity in law and is
rooted in the psychological need to satisfy reasonable expectations.''
Justice Cardozo in a similar vein, ``No judicial system could do society's work if each issue had
to be decided afresh in every case which raised it.''
In our initial conversation, you talked about stability and humility in the law. Would you agree
with those articulations of the principles of stare decisis as you had contemplated them, as you said
you looked for stability in the law?
Judge Roberts. Yes, Mr. Chairman, I would. I would point out that the principle goes back even farther than
Cardozo and Frankfurter. Hamilton, in Federalist No. 78, said that, ``To avoid an arbitrary discretion in the judges,
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probe the nominee’s attitude to Roe v. Wade and Planned Parenthood v. Casey, but Judge Roberts
would not budge from a refusal to comment on the status of those cases as precedent, let alone superprecedent. When pressed about preserving stability, expectations, and the Court’s legitimacy by not
overruling the core holding of Roe, the candidates’ strategy217 was to segue quickly to Brown v. Board
of Education’s218 overruling of Plessy v. Ferguson.219 It was rhetorically effective. Jurisprudential
theory was not going to be expounded in great depth in a senatorial hearing.
Shortly after introducing the topic of the doctrine of precedent, Senator Specter
raised the idea of super stare decisis, attributing it to Judge Luttig220 and referring also to
Professors Farber and Estrich, and asked: “Do you think that the cases which have
followed Roe fall into the category of a super-stare decisis designation?”221 Of course
Judge Roberts, having refused to say any more in the discussion of ordinary stare decisis,
was not going to bite: “I think one way to look at it is that the Casey decision itself, which
applied the principles of stare decisis to Roe v. Wade, is itself a precedent of the Court,
entitled to respect under principles of stare decisis. … And under principles of stare
decisis, that would be where any judge considering the issue in this area would begin.”222

they need to be bound down by rules and precedents.'' So even that far back, the Founders appreciated the role of
precedent in promoting evenhandedness, predictability, stability, the appearance of integrity in the judicial process.
They continued with a discussion of the importance of not disturbing “settled expectations” and reliance.
217
It was first used by Senator Brownback, Roberts’ Hearings, supra n__ at __ (“I would note that the
Supreme Court frequently has overruled prior precedents. A case founded in my State, Brown v. Board of
Education, which overruled Plessy v. Ferguson, fits within a broad pattern of revising previous decisions
since the founding.”) Judge Roberts picked up the theme early in his exchanges with Senator Specter; see
Roberts’ Hearings, supra n__ at __ (“An overruling of a prior precedent is a jolt to the legal system. It is
inconsistent with principles of stability and yet-- … the principles of stare decisis recognize that there are
situations when that's a price that has to be paid. Obviously, Brown v. Board of Education is a leading
example, overruling Plessy v. Ferguson.”)
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Would iterated affirmation make a decision super-precedent? Senator Specter
produced a chart showing
38 occasions where Roe has been taken up, not with a specific issue raised but all
with an opportunity for Roe to be overruled. … would you think that Roe might be
a super-duper precedent in light-- … [Laughter.] …--of 38 occasions to overrule
it?223
Judge Roberts did not make the contrary argument, that such frequent examination
suggested maladaptivity rather than super-precedential qualities,224 but simply ducked,
reiterating that Casey “I think is the decision that any judge in this area would begin
with.”225 Toward the end of the hearings Senator Specter took the opportunity to try this
argument on Professor Charles Fried, who agreed that, despite being “wrongly decided
initially”, Roe v. Wade had, by repeated affirmance, become a super-precedent.
Chairman Specter. Only super with 38 chances to reverse it?
Mr. Fried. Super duper, if you wish.
Chairman Specter. Oh, I do. Thank you very much.226
What about the passage of thirty-two years with stable expectations of a right to
abortion, so central to Casey? Senator Specter cleverly connected this with Judge Roberts’
characterizing “An overruling of a prior precedent [as] a jolt to the legal system …
inconsistent with principles of stability…”:227 hadn’t the late Chief Justice Rhenquist
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Roberts’ Hearings, supra n__ at __.
In the Alito hearings, Senator DeWine came prepared with a brief against the super-precedential status of Roe v. Wade,
including this argument; see Alito hearings, supra n__ at __ (“Third, from the start, Roe has been criticized by lawyers,
scholars and judges, whether Democrats or Republicans and, to date, it does remain controversial. … In other words, super
precedent is precedent that is so firmly entrenched in our legal system that people simply don't question it.”)
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Roberts’ Hearings, supra n__ at __. Fried then added, expounded, using other super-precedent bases: “It is not only that
it has been reaffirmed as to abortion, but that it has ramified, it has struck roots, so it has been cited and used in the Lawrence
case, the homosexual sodomy case, in some of the opinions in the right-to-die cases, in the Troxall case, which is the
grandparent visiting right case. So it is not only that it is there and it is a big tree, but it has ramified and exfoliated, and it
would be an enormous disruption.” ‘exfoliated’ brought some humorous byplay. Id.
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overtly opposed Miranda228 in 1974,229 but acquiesced in Dickerson230 twenty-five years
later precisely because “it became ``so embedded in routine police practice to the point
where the warnings have become a part of our National culture.''”?231 Judge Roberts
(correctly) doubted that the late C.J.’s personal “views of the underlying correctness of
Miranda had changed,”232 but then evaded, refusing to face the analogy. He did not, as he
easily might have, cite the time between Plessy and Roe, or point out that Miranda had not
been under the constant hostile fire suffered by Roe in those thirty-two years.
Surprisingly, there is something to be learned about the concept of super-precedent
in this rhetorical fencing, and it also is suggestive of the (then) future Chief Justice’s
attitude to it. For Senator Specter, clearly well primed, durability and surviving attack add
to a case’s stature, enhancing its claim to be a super-precedent. If the concept ever gains
common currency in law talk, these factors will presumably be intrinsic to it. But the
future Chief Justice would have none of it. A precedent is a starting point, to be considered
deferentially, with, as he was fond of repeating, modesty, as were the views of his
colleagues on the bench.233 Super-precedent would not seem to have a place in this
jurisprudence.
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For example, see Roberts’ Hearings, supra n__ at __(“… and judges have to have the modesty to be open
in the decisional process to the considered views of their colleagues on the bench.”) or responding to an
encomium from Senator Hatch, Roberts’ Hearings, supra n__ at __(“ Like most people, I resist the labels. I
have told people when pressed that I prefer to be known as a modest judge … It means an appreciation that
the role of the judge is limited, that a judge is to decide the cases before them, they're not to legislate, they're
not to execute the laws. Another part of that humility has to do with respect for precedent that forms part of
the rule of law that the judge is obligated to apply under principles of stare decisis. Part of that modesty has
to do with being open to the considered views of your colleagues on the bench.”). Senator Schumer took up
the notion of modesty with Judge Roberts (“But when you have the conflict, a past error decision that was
fundamentally immodest, let us say, and then years and years of it being on the books, stability argues keep it
on the books, and even modesty, with its respect for precedent argues keep it on the books. How do you draw
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Other senators recurred to the topic, but none with the thoroughness or determination of Senator
Specter. Senator Hatch was “not sure that a super-duper precedent exists”234 but nevertheless worked on
undermining the concept as it might apply to the Roe—Casey line by counting votes: “There were only
a few votes to simply reaffirm Roe, were there not, in the Casey case?”235 If ‘super-precedent’ becomes
common currency, quite possibly the solidity of the Supreme Court justices in a decision could become
a factor.
Senator Hatch then went to work on the relative weakness of constitutional precedents as further
undermining the possibility of ascribing “super-precedent” to them.236 It is a valid point. Even if in the
legal literature we like to focus on constitutional cases, foundational common law cases are likely to
provide better examples of super-precedents: think of cases like Hadley v. Baxendale237 or Dickinson
v. Dodd238 in contracts, or foundational negligence cases like Brown v. Kendall239 in tort.
Although Judge Roberts would not acknowledge super-precedents when pressed by Senator
Specter, he later acknowledged different levels of precedential value –different “planes” –putting
Marbury v. Madison and Brown v. Board of Education on a higher plane than commerce clause
precedents. Senator Schumer had been questioning him on the sequence Wickard v. Filburn,240 -- United

that? Can you just elaborate a little bit on how you weigh those two different concepts of ``modesty?''”
Roberts’ Hearings, supra n__ at _); Roberts reply added to his prior discussions of stare decisis that a modest
judge recognized that “we're not smarter than our fathers who laid down this precedent.”, a thought he
attributed to Professor Ford. Id.
234
Roberts’ Hearings, supra n__ at _
235
Id; Judge Roberts in response simply explained Casey.
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See Roberts’ Hearings, supra n__ at _(“ Is precedent equally authoritative in, for example, regulatory or statutory cases as
in constitutional cases?...”) Judge Roberts simply agreed; see Roberts’ Hearings, supra n__ at _(“The Court has frequently
explained that stare decisis is strongest when you're dealing with a statutory decision. The theory is a very straightforward
one that if the Court gets it wrong, Congress can fix it. And the Constitution, the Court has explained, is different. Obviously,
short of amendment, only the Court can fix the constitutional precedents.”)
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States v. Lopez241 -- Gonzales v. Raich.242 The candidate Chief Justice’s response illustrates exactly the
distinction that casts doubt on Roe -- Casey and Gregg v. Georgia as super-precedents.
Nobody in recent years has been arguing whether Marbury v. Madison is good law.
Nobody has been arguing whether Brown v. Board of Education was good law.
They have been arguing whether Wickard v. Filburn is good law. Now, it was
reaffirmed in the Raich case and that is a precedent of the Court, just like Wickard,
that I would apply like any other precedent. I have no agenda to overturn it. I have
no agenda to revisit it. It's a precedent of the Court.
But I do think it's a bit much to say it's on the same plane as a precedent as
Marbury v. Madison and Brown v. Board of Education … [o]r Griswold. The fact
that it was just reconsidered and reargued last year in the Raich case suggests that
it's not that same type of case.243
It also suggests that even if the Chief Justice does not use the nascent jargon, he recognizes
the superiority of some precedents.244
The confirmation hearings for Judge, now Justice Samuel Alito, in January of 2006,245 included
much discussion of precedent and super-precedent, but did not add anything of interest. For the most
part the Senators’ questions were designed to induce the nominee to agree or disagree that the Roe v.
Wade --- Casey line of cases was super-precedent or “settled law”, or, more often, to pronounce loudly
the questioner’s position. Judge Alito, like Chief Justice Roberts four months earlier, was not going to
say any more than that it was precedent entitled to respect as such. And, again like the Chief Justice
before him, Judge Alito was prepared to produce a set piece on stare decisis at a moment’s notice and as
often as possible.
As to Judge Luttig’s neologism, Judge Alito also would have none of it. In response to
questioning by Senator Specter, he iterated the factors making the doctrine of precedent important, but
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gave special emphasis to reliance.246 But when Senator Specter ran through the grounds on which he
had posited Casey and its progenitor, Roe v. Wade, as super-precedent,247 and asked explicitly “Do you
agree that Casey is a super precedent or a super stare decisis as Judge Luttig said?” Judge Alito simply
rejected the classification. “Well, I personally would not get into categorizing precedents as super
precedents or super duper precedents.”248 He expressly rejected iterated reaffirmation as creating superprecedent, although said it was “a factor that should be taken into account in making the judgment about
stare decisis,”249 especially as it enhanced reliance.250 And he added that “when a precedent is
reaffirmed on the ground that stare decisis precludes or counsels against reexamination of the merits of
the precedent, then I agree that that is a precedent on precedent.”251
In the hearings, the terms “super-precedent” and “super stare decisis” were often used but hardly
accepted as established jargon. To the contrary, they were often treated with scepticism:
Senator Cornyn: “…Roe v. Wade, and some have suggested, law professors and maybe others,
that somehow that is a super precedent, or in the words of our inimitable Chairman, a superduper precedent. I think we are introducing new words to the legal lexicon as this hearing goes
on.”252
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Or humor:
Senator Feinstein re Roe --- Casey: “as Senator Specter has said, that superprecedent is really in play? I think I even heard him once say super-duper
precedent. Could that be?
Chairman Specter. I said super-duper in the context of some 38 occasions when the
Court has had the Roe issue before it and they could have overruled Roe had they
decided to do so-Senator Feinstein. Right.
Chairman Specter.--so it became a super-precedent. With the reaffirmation, it may
become a super-duper or maybe even more, super-duper-duper-[Laughter.]
Senator Feinstein. Super-duper-duper-Chairman Specter.--38 times over.”253
An exception was Senator DeWine, who gave a detailed account of super-precedent as he saw it,254
including all the arguments from the Roberts hearings. His purpose was to deny that Roe v. Wade would
count, and for the most part his speech was tailored for reading, for the record rather than for the
moment. But he adopted the neologism, giving Marbury v. Madison as an example.255

Conclusion
‘Super-precedent’ really just names one extreme end of a range of precedential power we have long
recognized. The variety in precedential force and its having a nameable extreme is a natural
consequence of the declaratory and standard theories of stare decisis, fitting easily and coherently into
their explanatory schema. It does not fit as easily with Langdell’s quasi-empiricism or the enactment
theory; this is hardly surprising in light of their inadequacy as accounts of the doctrine. Legal realism
could account for the empirical fact of our treating some cases with greater reverence but, as a denial of
the power of precedent to constrain decisions, it could hardly explain it. Examining the intelligibility of
253
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Judge Lutting’s neologism in the context of these theories castes some light on both ‘super-precedent’
and the theories themselves.
Will the neologism catch on? Will it become a part of ordinary legal usage? It didn’t at its first
introduction by Landes and Posner in 1976.256 That might suggest it is merely classificatory, and not
especially useful analytically. Yet classifications can be useful. The Linnaean system may be merely
classification but it has greatly facilitated the advance of biology and the storing and communication of
knowledge. Might a systematic classification of precedential power serve such a purpose?
At one end of the scale would be super-precedents, at the other end, perhaps, “mini-“ or “microprecedents”. That doesn’t look very plausible, or useful. We already have a vocabulary of intuitive
descriptions for the purpose: “inconsequential,” “fragile,” “narrow,” “easily avoided” for example,
contrasting with Professor Farber’s “bedrock precedent,” “foundational,” “settled” and the like. We
can easily express the variety in precedential force without creating a linear gradation.
‘Super-precedent’ suits powerful precedents of which we approve. “Black hole” might be better
for those of which we do not. Think for example of Dickinson v. Dodd, 257 the progenitor of the law that
an option contract is simply a contract on all fours with any other, thus requiring consideration (or,
where recognized, justifiable reliance) to be enforceable. It might be described as a “black hole”
because it has such gravity that it sucks in everything in its vicinity, including light. Perhaps one should
say “especially light”: it comes as a surprise to neophytes, as it should. But it has such power that even
the drafters of the Uniform Commercial Code, setting many things right in common law contracts,
would only defy it in a narrowly hedged, formalistic exception.258
That some cases should be more solidly ensconced and of more determinate consequence than
others is hardly surprising. We already have suitably ordinary and unsystematic ways to talk about
256
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qualities of precedents, into which Judge Luttig’s neologism fits comfortably. If it comes into common
usage it will be because of its intuitive appeal and not because it purports to formal consequence or
analytical significance. I’m sure Judge Lutting –and Landes and Posner a quarter century before him –
intended no more. The informal, unpretentious usage of Senator Specter fits this mould.
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